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Trade policy and food security are linked in complex ways. Their 
relationship to one another must be examined closely if we wish to understand 
the ways in which the international trade regime might help or hinder 
efforts to address hunger and food insecurity. Anne Orford’s contribution 
underscores the importance of digging deep to uncover the origins of the 
norms that underpin the international trade governance framework, which 
in turn have implications for food security and hunger.1 International norms 
are widely understood to be “standards of behavior defined in terms of 
rights and obligations”2 and are rooted in actors’ identities and preferences 
for the structure of rules and institutions.3 As such, international norms have 
significance for the development of legal regimes. Orford’s analysis suggests 
that the norm of “free trade” has long historical roots and is inextricably tied 
to a broader debate about the role of the state and the market in society. Her 
account of the rise of the “free trade state” helps us to understand why trade 
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liberalization was taken up as a policy in the agricultural sector under the 
auspices of the GATT/WTO trade regime in recent decades.
Just as it is important to uncover the historical origins of specific norms 
that shape the trade regime, it is also helpful to examine how those norms 
are then translated into policy through contemporary rules and agreements. 
In this commentary, I argue that the articulation of agricultural trade norms 
into policy is an ongoing and messy process, complicated by multiple and 
competing norms that are mediated by power and politics. In making this 
argument, I advance three interrelated points. First, politics and power 
differentials among competing interests help to explain why the “free trade” 
norm has been only partially and unevenly applied in the agricultural sector. 
Second, recognition of the unbalanced agricultural trade regime in recent 
decades has provided an opening for the expression of alternative agricultural 
trade norms, in particular the idea of special and differential treatment for 
food security in developing countries. Third, the recent political battle at the 
WTO over food security demonstrates that multiple trade norms for food 
and agriculture continue to collide and shift through political processes and 
remain deeply contested.
I .  URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON 
AGRICULTURE: UNEVEN RULES
For much of the 20th century, agricultural trade was not governed by 
a norm of “free trade,” even if the broader norm was embedded in global 
economic institutions for other sectors. From the inception of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 until the mid-1980s, agriculture was 
effectively exempted from formal rules governing the global trade regime.4 
Although the trade in agricultural products was technically covered under 
the GATT rules, in practice member states, developed and developing alike, 
instituted complex systems of agricultural trade policies that included various 
mixes of subsidies, tariffs, quotas, marketing boards and taxes.5 These policies 
aimed to support the sector in some cases, and to draw revenue from it in 
others. Domestic support policies had been in place in the US, for example, 
since the 1930s, even as the US government pursued mercantilist policies that 
sought to open foreign markets for its agricultural exports.6
The exemption of agriculture from international trade rules reflected a 
different norm prevalent in government policy frameworks at that time, one 
4. Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International 
Trade Negotiations (London, UK: Zed, 2003) [Jawara and Kwa].
5. Ataman M Aksoy, “Global Agricultural Trade Policies,” in Ataman M Aksoy & John C Beghin, 
eds, Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005) 
at 37-53 [Aksoy].
6. Harriet Friedmann,“The Political Economy of Food: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar 
International Food Order” (1982) Am J Sociology S248.
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that saw food as fundamentally different from other commodities because 
of its significance for national security. Many democratic states sought to 
protect their food growing capacity and rural areas for political reasons, 
and farming groups represented important voting blocs.7 Food was also 
utilized as a tool of foreign policy by the United States, particularly during 
the Cold War.8 More recently, the European Union has promoted the idea of 
‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture, stressing not just food security but also the 
sector’s role in the provision of environmental services and its significance for 
culture and identity.9
Recognition of the unique role of agriculture made governments wary of 
subjecting the sector to the rules of international trade. This “food is different” 
norm was in fact dominant in many countries throughout most of the 20th 
century. The strength of this norm was bolstered by the fact that the United 
States, as the dominant political power in the international system, was 
unwilling to subject its own agricultural sector to free trade. To do so would 
disturb the carefully crafted system of supports that the country had put into 
place over the previous half century, which had enormous domestic political 
and economic importance. The European Communities followed the US lead 
in this respect, and constructed their own complex sets of agricultural policies 
to support the sector,10 while many developing countries relied on taxes and 
marketing boards as a means by which to raise revenue from the sector.11
The rules governing the international agricultural trade regime began 
to shift in the 1980s with the rise of neoliberal economic policies in many 
countries.12 In the mid-1980s, agricultural subsidies in the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries amounted to over 
US$300 billion per year, and were widely considered to be highly distortive 
to international markets.13 The US, Europe, and Japan found it increasingly 
difficult to keep up levels of agricultural subsidies and other protections due 
to their rising cost, and faced complaints from agricultural exporters such 
as Australia, Canada and Argentina that those subsidies were depressing 
7. Bill Winders, The Politics of Food Supply: US Agricultural Policy in the World Economy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
8. Nick Cullather, The Hungry World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
9. Clive Potter and Mark Tilzey, “Agricultural Multifunctionality, Environmental Sustainability 
and the WTO: Resistance or Accommodation to the Neoliberal Project for Agriculture?” (2007) 
38:6 Geoforum 1290.
10. Mlada Bukovansky, “Institutionalized Hypocrisy and the Politics of Agricultural Trade,” in 
Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, & Craig Parsons, eds, Constructing the International Economy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010) at 68-89 [Bukovansky].
11. Aksoy, supra note 5.
12. Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael, “Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and 
Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present” (1989) 29:2 Sociologia Ruralis 93.
13. Dimitris Diakosawas, “The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in Practice: How Open 
Are OECD Markets?” (2001), online at: OECD <http://www.oecd.org./dataoecd/54/61/2540717.
pdf> [Diakosawas].
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world grain prices to the point of causing harm to their farming sectors.14 
Many developing countries also complained that agricultural trade practices, 
including heavy subsidies in the industrialized countries and tied food 
aid, were outcompeting their own farmers and contributing to their rising 
dependence on food imports.15 In this context, a range of countries began to 
call for the acceptance of some liberalization in the agricultural sector under 
the auspices of the GATT.
The GATT Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 and included 
negotiations on an Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that sought to liberalize 
trade in the sector. But the AoA rules that were eventually agreed upon in 1994 
were not a model of free trade, nor did they bring about a balanced process 
of gradual liberalization. Rather, the rules that were established were uneven 
in their scope and application, characterized by a high degree of hypocrisy.16 
The agreement reflected a negotiation process that sought two norms—the 
long-standing approach that saw food and agriculture as different on one 
hand, and the trade liberalization norm on the other hand—in competition 
with one another. The outcome was one that was mediated through the 
power dynamics of the negotiating countries. The agreement that resulted 
was a curious mix that demanded market-opening measures in developing 
countries, while at the same time allowing industrialized countries to continue 
to protect their own markets through a range of domestic support measures.17
A closer look at the details of the agreement and the political process behind 
it helps to briefly illustrate how this outcome came about. The AoA called 
for liberalization across three pillars: market access measures (the conversion 
of quantitative restrictions and other border measures into tariffs and the 
reduction of agricultural tariffs), domestic support measures (reductions in 
trade distorting farm subsidies), and export competition (reduction of export 
subsidies). Different countries use these tools in different combinations, and 
more powerful countries successfully pushed for the greatest liberalization in 
the pillars that their competitors made use of, while minimizing liberalization 
measures in the pillars that were central to their own domestic farm policies.
The US and EU, for example, as powerful negotiating countries, ensured 
that the bulk of their domestic support subsidies were exempted from cuts, 
while at the same time demanding further market liberalization in developing 
14. Robert Wolfe, Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the International Trade Regime 
(London: Macmillan, 1998); Christina L. Davis, Food Fights Over Free Trade: How International 
Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
15. Jennifer Clapp, Hunger in the Balance: The New Politics of International Food Aid (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2012).
16. Bukovansky, supra note 10.
17. Jennifer Clapp and Kim Burnett, “Governing Trade in Global Food and Agriculture,” in 
Manuela Moschella & Catherine Weaver, eds, Handbook of Global Economic Governance (New 
York: Routledge, 2013) at 79-94 [Clapp and Burnett].
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countries.18 They were able to do this by devising a series of “boxes” to 
classify domestic support measures (amber, blue, and green) that were 
sorted according to the extent to which they distorted trade. Subsidies that 
were considered trade distorting were placed in the amber box and subject 
to cuts. Subsidies that included provisions to limit production, despite being 
recognized as potentially trade distorting, were placed in the blue box and 
were also exempt from cuts. Subsidies that were considered non-distorting or 
minimally-distorting of trade were placed in the green box and were exempted 
from cuts. Using this box system, the powerful countries were able to define 
certain types of agricultural subsidies as legitimate within the context of the 
trade regime. Rather than being forced to reduce their domestic support, they 
could simply shift their subsidies into those boxes that were exempt from 
disciplines.19 This enabled these countries to hang onto the idea that food is 
different while casting their practices as consistent with trade liberalization.
To give themselves extra coverage as they shifted their subsidies among 
the boxes, the US and EU secured a ‘Peace Clause’ that protected them from 
challenges on their subsidy cuts for a period of ten years. It would, after all, 
take some time to redefine their subsidy policies to ensure that most of their 
payments in the sector fell into the green box. The industrialized countries 
also pressed for tariff reduction formulas that allowed them to continue 
practices that applied higher tariffs on products exported by developing 
countries, through the practices of tariff peaks and tariff escalation, claiming 
that these measures resulted in overall liberalization because average rates 
fell.20 Again, the two norms—trade liberalization and food is different—were 
cast as being compatible.
But while the norms of liberalization on one hand, and food is different on 
the other, were pursued side by side in the industrialized countries, the rules 
for developing countries offered little by way of compatibility. At the same 
time that they negotiated to keep their existing practices, the industrialized 
countries pushed hard for rules that required developing countries to make 
substantial cuts to their own tariffs on imports—the main agricultural sector 
management tool at their disposal given that they could not afford complex 
subsidy programs.21 Moreover, the tariff cuts that the industrialized countries 
demanded from the developing countries were on top of tariff cuts made a 
decade earlier under programs of structural adjustment.22
18. Jawara and Kwa, supra note 4; Bill Pritchard, “The Long Hangover from the Second Food 
Regime: A World-Historical Interpretation of the Collapse of the WTO Doha Round” (2009) 26:4 
Agriculture & Human Values 297 [Pritchard].
19. Martin Khor, “Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning of the WTO, Geneva, 
The South Centre” (May 2010), online: South Centre <http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/RP30_Analysis-of-the-DOHA-negotiations-and-WTO_EN.pdf> [Khor].
20. Clapp and Burnett, supra note 17.
21. Pritchard, supra note 18.
22. Khor, supra note 19.
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This combination of policies—deep market liberalization in the poorest 
countries and continued subsidy support in the richest countries—has resulted 
in a highly unbalanced governance framework for agricultural trade that 
became enshrined in the Agreement on Agriculture when the Uruguay Round 
was completed in 1994.23 In the decades that followed, industrialized country 
subsidies did not decline by much because they were able to shift many of 
their domestic support programs into the green box, while many developing 
countries’ markets were further opened to imports.24 The result was that many 
developing countries experienced import surges of basic foodstuffs, namely 
subsidized grains that were exported by industrialized countries and often 
‘dumped’ at below the cost of production.25 These cheap imports proved to be 
stiff competition for farmers in developing countries. In this period, many of 
the world’s least developed countries became increasingly dependent on food 
imports, while their own farm sectors declined.26
Although a norm of liberalization underpinned the initiative to negotiate 
the AoA, the resulting agreement was hardly a model of “free trade.” The 
lack of balance in the agreement was a product of the ways in which politics 
mediated the application of two distinct norms. The industrialized countries 
were able to maintain policies that supported the idea that food is different 
at home, while painting them as compatible with liberalization in the WTO 
context. At the same time, developing countries were forced to liberalize 
while their ability to enact policies that treated food differently in support 
of their own development needs was curtailed, with negative implications 
for food security. Completely free trade in the sector would likely have been 
equally problematic for food security, as I have discussed elsewhere.27 But 
the problem with the AoA in practice was primarily its uneven nature that 
enabled industrialized countries to continue to protect their own agricultural 
sectors while pushing developing countries to liberalize.
23. Olivier De Schutter, “International Trade in Agriculture and the Right to Food” (2009) online: 
Dialogue on Globalization, Occasional Paper No 46 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung <http://library.fes.
de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/06819.pdf>.
24. OECD, “The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: An Evaluation of Its Implementation 
in OECD Countries” (2001), online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/55/1912374.pdf>; 
Diakosawas, supra note 13.
25. Ben Lilliston, Sophia Murphy, & Mary Beth Lake, “WTO Agreement on Agriculture: A Decade 
of Dumping” (2005), online: <http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/cso/cso7/library.pdf>; South Centre, 
“The Extent of Agriculture Import Surges in Developing Countries: What are the Trends?” 
(Geneva: South Centre, 2009).
26. Timothy Wise and Sophia Murphy, “Resolving the Food Crisis: Assessing Global Policy 
Reforms since 2007” (January 18, 2012) online: Global Development and Environment Institute  
(GDAI) <http://iatp.org/documents/resolving-the-food-crisis-assessing-global-policy- 
reforms-since-2007>.
27. Jennifer Clapp, “Trade Liberalization and Food Security: Examining the Linkages” (2014) 
online: Quaker UN Office <http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/QUNO_Food%20
Security_Clapp.pdf>.
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II.  DOHA: EXPANDING POLICY SPACE FOR FOOD 
SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
WTO members foresaw the need to continue reform in the agricultural 
sector, and incorporated a built-in agenda for the next round of trade talks 
into the final text of the AoA that required the agreement to be revisited. The 
direction taken in the next round of talks was not a push for full liberalization 
of the agricultural sector, however. Rather, another norm—special and 
differential treatment (SDT)—emerged as a key mechanism by which 
members attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the food is 
different and liberalization norms as they applied to developing countries. 
But while SDT in relation to food security was given a prominent place in 
the Doha Round even before negotiations began, its uptake and operational-
ization within international trade negotiations over the past 15 years has been 
anything but smooth.
The broader norm of SDT for developing countries is not new, having been 
an accepted idea within the trade regime since at least the 1950s.28 Nor is it 
specific to agriculture. The norm was formalized in 1979 through the adoption 
of an “Enabling Clause” that specifically called for preferential market access 
for developing countries as well as exemption from reciprocity “consistent 
with development needs” of poorer countries.29 SDT, as part of the trade 
regime, was supposed to be incorporated in the negotiation of the Uruguay 
Round AoA. In practice, however, it mainly translated into longer times for 
developing countries to implement liberalization measures and exemptions 
only for the very poorest countries.30
The 1994 AoA specified that non-trade concerns, including food security 
and environmental considerations, as well as special and differential treatment, 
were to be taken into account in future trade negotiations.31 This implied an 
emergent norm that combined some elements of the food is different norm, 
specifically the food security aspects of agriculture unique to developing 
countries, with the broader norm of SDT, in a way that would establish greater 
‘policy space’ for food security for developing countries within the context of 
the agreement. The hope was that the SDT for food security would mediate 
between the unique food security circumstances in developing countries 
28. Joseph Senona, “Negotiating Special and Differential Treatment from Doha to Post-Hong 
Kong: Can Poor People Still Benefit?” (2008) 42:6 J World Trade 1041; Andrew Mitchell 
and Tania Voon, “Operationalizing Special and Differential Treatment in the World Trade 
Organization: Game Over?” (2009) 15:3 Global Governance 343.
29. Bernard Hoekman, Constantine Michalopoulos, & L. Alan Winter, “Special and Differential 
Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO: Moving Forward After Cancun” (2004) 27:4 The 
World Economy 481 at 482-483.
30. International Institute for Sustainable Development, “The Development Box” (2003) online: 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_sdc_may_2003_5.pdf> [IISD Brief].
31. WTO, “Agreement on Agriculture” (1994), online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/14-ag_02_e.htm>.
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and the broader push for trade liberalization.32 The growing emphasis on 
the right to food within the United Nations following the 1996 World Food 
Summit also supported the idea of treating food security differently within 
the trade regime.33
Prior to the launch of the Doha Round, developing countries, including 
India and Pakistan, led efforts to advocate for a ‘Development Box’ and a ‘Food 
Security Box’ in a revised AoA, to recognize and legitimize the developing 
country policies that prioritized food security and rural development over 
trade liberalization.34 Many developing countries argued that the 1994 AoA 
ironically reflected a kind of special and differential treatment for the richer 
countries, and made a strong case that the norm of SDT for developing 
countries should be taken seriously, particularly in the area of agriculture and 
food security.35 The idea of SDT for agriculture and food security was formally 
adopted as part of the “Doha Development Agenda” that set the frame for the 
broader talks, and was specifically mentioned in the Doha Declaration:
“We agree that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall 
be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied 
in the schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the 
rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to 
enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development 
needs, including food security and rural development. We take note of the 
non-trade concerns reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by 
Members and confirm that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in 
the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture.”36
The attention given to the norm of special and differential treatment for 
food security early on in the Doha AoA negotiations represented an important 
shift in the process of defining trade rules for agriculture. But despite the 
explicit mention of this idea in the WTO texts, tensions remain between the 
various norms and the exercise of defining and claiming policy space for food 
security has been fraught with challenges throughout the Doha negotiations.37
32. James R. Simpson and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, “Non-Trade Concerns in WTO Trade 
Negotiations: Legal and Legitimate Reasons for Revising the ‘Box’ System” (2003) 2:3 Intl J 
Agricultural Resources, Governance & Ecology 399.
33. Matias Margulis, “The Regime Complex for Food Security: Implications for the Global Hunger 
Challenge” (2013) 19:1 Global Governance 53 [Margulis].
34. IISD Brief, supra note 30; Takumi Sakuyama, “A Decade of Debate over Non-Trade Concerns 
and Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: Convergences, Remaining Conflicts and a Way Forward” 
(2005) 4:3 Intl J Agricultural Resources, Governance & Ecology 203 [Sakuyama].
35. Sakuyama, supra note 34.
36. WTO, “Doha Declaration” (2001), online: <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/mindecl_e.htm>.
37. Margulis, supra note 33.
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The power dynamics in the Doha agriculture talks differed from the 
Uruguay Round in important ways. Rather than bowing to industrialized 
country demands as they did a decade earlier, a number of developing 
countries, which had grown to become important economic players, took an 
aggressive stance early on in the Doha negotiations.38 These countries placed 
SDT claims for greater policy space around food security and agriculture 
high on their agendas and organized negotiating groups around these issues. 
Industrialized countries, however, have been reluctant to embrace SDT for 
food security in practice and have consistently challenged these proposals. 
Even though they admit that their past practices did distort trade, they see their 
current practices that support agriculture as being consistent with the norm of 
liberalization and they have pressed for the same approach for developing 
countries. Developing countries see this as a double standard and the talks 
have been tense throughout. Although proposals for an explicit Development 
Box or Food Security Box were eventually abandoned, the SDT principles 
behind the idea have been pursued through other proposals put forward by 
new negotiating groups led by developing countries.39
Two developing country groupings stood out in this process of claiming 
SDT for agriculture. India and Brazil have played leadership roles in the Group 
of 20 negotiating group, initially made up of 20 developing countries that called 
for substantial reductions in the agricultural subsidies of the industrialized 
countries, as well as the reduction of unfair tariff practices against developing 
countries.40 Indonesia and India have taken up leadership roles in the Group of 
33, a group of developing countries calling for recognition of “special products” 
that are important for farmer livelihoods, as well as the installation of a special 
safeguard mechanism (SSM) that would provide a shield from surges in cheap 
food imports.41 The G33 also took up proposals seeking to ensure exemptions 
from trade disciplines for public stockholding programs instituted for food 
security purposes.42 The Group of 20 and the Group of 33 have become key 
players in the agriculture negotiations and both have extensive memberships 
behind them that go well beyond their initial numbers.43
38. Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie, “The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries 
and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO” (2004) 27:7 The World Economy 947 [Narlikar and 
Tussie]; Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson, “Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-Mortem” 
(2004) 25:3 Third World Q 447; Kristen Hopewell, “Different Paths to Power: The Rise of Brazil, 
India and China at the World Trade Organization” (2015) 22:2 Rev of Intl Political Economy 
311 [Hopewell].
39. Rashid Kaukab, “Coalitions and Alliance Strategies for Developing Countries in the Doha 
Round of Agricultural Negotiations,” in Alex McCalla & John Nash, eds, Reforming Agricultural 
Trade or Developing Countries (World Bank, 2007) at 132-153.
40. Narlikar and Tussie, supra note 38.
41. Clapp and Burnett, supra note 17.
42. Hopewell, supra note 38.
43. Membership of these groups is listed on the WTO website at: http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm.
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The specific proposals from these groups for SDT mechanisms within the 
context of the agriculture negotiations have been constant flashpoints since 
the early 2000s.44 A draft text of the agreement was put forward by the chair of 
the agriculture talks in 2008—indicating likely areas of agreement—including 
draft wording for SSM and public stockholding, among others.45 But the draft 
sat idle with no movement for five years, and disagreements over the SSM 
were widely cited as the reason for the deadlock.46 The political tension over 
food security throughout the Doha negotiations is in some ways not surprising 
given that emergent and alternative norms are often contested over extended 
periods of time, shaped and reshaped by politics, before they are widely 
accepted and institutionalized.47
III .  RECENT FOOD SECURITY TENSIONS AT THE WTO: 
BALI AND BEYOND
The fact that food security issues have again become a lightning rod at 
the WTO in recent years—just as attempts were made to revitalize the trade 
talks—demonstrates the centrality of agriculture and the ongoing deeply 
contested nature of the various agricultural trade norms within the trade 
regime. Pressure for liberalization and special treatment for food security in 
developing countries came into direct conflict at the Bali Ministerial meeting 
in late 2013 and gave rise to ongoing tensions in the organization over the 
matter throughout most of 2014.
The controversy was an outgrowth of an attempt to breathe life back into 
the WTO negotiations by securing agreement on a small package of what were 
seen as noncontroversial issues at the Bali Ministerial.48 One of the agricultural 
items on the table, public stockholding for food security purposes, threw a 
wrench into those plans. India, advocating a G33 proposal to exempt public 
stockholding programs for food security purposes from trade disciplines, 
threatened to withdraw its support for a broader trade facilitation agreement 
unless consensus was also reached on rules for public stockholding.
The G33 and other developing country groups had regularly put forward 
proposals on public stockholding for food security purposes throughout 
the entire Doha negotiations, but those proposals faced repeated resistance 
from the industrialized countries. In the run-up to Bali, the US was adamant 
that it did not support the G33’s latest proposal. The US charged that India’s 
44. Sakuyama, supra note 34.
45. WTO, “Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture 2008” (December 6, 2008), online: <http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm>.
46. Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, “On Food Security Stocks, Peace Clauses and Permanent Solutions 
after Bali” (2014), online: IFPRI Discussion Paper 01388 <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/
publications/ifpridp01388.pdf> [Diaz Bonilla].
47. Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, eds, Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).
48. Diaz-Bonilla, supra note 46.
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public stockholding program, which was part of its new domestic food 
security policy, was in contravention of 1994 AoA rules because it included a 
guaranteed government purchase price, a practice that is subject to disciplines 
if that price exceeds the fixed reference price and is thus considered a subsidy. 
The issue was complicated by the fact that the reference price in the WTO 
agreement is set at prices prevailing in 1986-88, which is wildly outdated since 
the drastic food price rises of 2007-08.49 Going into the Bali meeting, both sides 
refused to back down.
Tensions ran high at Bali, but the impasse was eventually overcome when 
a ‘peace clause’ was finally agreed that stipulated that no legal challenges 
could be launched against existing public stockholding programs until a 
permanent solution was reached. Although the wording of the peace clause 
was ambiguous, India took the Bali agreement to indicate that a permanent 
solution would be sought. But later in 2014, it became clear that India and the 
US had different interpretations of whether the peace clause was temporary or 
permanent. India again refused to adopt the trade facilitation measures until 
it had clarity on the food security issue. India’s stance once again resulted 
in heated and intense discussions at the WTO, but agreement was finally 
reached in late 2014 to clarify that the peace clause would remain in place 
until a permanent solution was agreed to, and that attempts would be made 
to find a permanent solution to the public stockholding programs before 
the end of 2015.50
This most recent blow-up over food security at the WTO reveals the 
contradictions that result from the coexistence of multiple and at times 
competing trade norms as well as the shifts in power among the WTO 
membership. As emerging powers such as India have gained clout within the 
trade talks, the US has staunchly resisted the norm of special and differential 
treatment for agriculture and food security on the grounds that it might distort 
trade, affecting its own export markets in addition to undercutting farmers 
in poorer developing countries. The US has been especially concerned about 
the trend of rising domestic support subsidies in emerging economies such as 
India. In taking this stance, the US has prioritized the norm of liberalization 
over SDT, deflecting attention from both its past trade distorting practices, as 
well as the concessions it won for itself in the Uruguay Round. The US fought 
hard against agreeing to a peace clause on the matter at Bali, even though it 
had itself benefited from a generous peace clause over agricultural subsidies 
in the Uruguay Round.
This hypocrisy of the US position is all the more troubling given the 
significance of food security and livelihood issues in developing countries, 
49. Timothy Wise, “Battle Won, The War Goes On” (2014) online: <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/
rp/GC69Jan14Wise.pdf>.
50. Sophia Murphy, “What You Need to Know about the India-US Agreement at the WTO IATP” 
(2014), online: <http://www.iatp.org/blog/201411/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-india-us- 
agreement-at-the-wto>.
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including large emerging economies.51 India is home to over 240 million 
chronically undernourished people, over a quarter of the world’s 805 million 
hungry people.52 Over 40% of children in India are stunted, meaning they do 
not acquire enough food to achieve their full growth potential. Stunting has 
lifelong impact on individual quality of life and affects countries’ long-term 
economic performance.53 A significant proportion of the undernourished 
people in India, as in many developing countries, live in rural areas and rely 
on agriculture for their livelihoods.54 The importance of addressing issues of 
hunger and food insecurity in this context cannot be overstated. Industrialized 
countries once pursued the very policies that India and the G33 are demanding 
for developing countries. While the former were largely pursuing those 
policies to advance their export markets, the latter have greater claim to use 
them due to their pressing food security concerns at home.
IV. CONCLUSION
The process of translating norms into policy is not always linear, as the case 
of the agricultural trade regime makes clear. Multiple norms coexist within the 
regime, and power and interests influence how those norms are interpreted 
and operationalized. It is not at all clear what the outcome for agriculture will 
be, if the Doha talks are ever completed. The negotiations are muddied by 
distinct and competing norms that have pitted liberalization against special 
and differential treatment for developing countries, and the idea that food 
and agriculture are unique and require alternative arrangements in the trade 
regime. The industrialized countries claimed that these various norms were 
compatible for themselves in the negotiation of the Uruguay Round AoA. 
But they have seen these norms as being in competition with one another 
when developing countries have tried to claim expanded policy space for 
agriculture and food security in the Doha Round. The controversy at Bali was 
a clear illustration of this double standard. The shifting power dynamics at the 
WTO, however, has kept the norm of SDT for food security and agriculture in 
play. The fact that the issue gained such a high profile, and was able to bring 
the rest of the WTO negotiations to a standstill, indicates that these alternative 
ideas have gained some ground within the trade regime. Thus far, however, 
developing countries have been more successful at ensuring that the items 
remain on the agenda, rather than ensuring the wider embrace of alternative 
norms and their adoption into the legal framework of the agreement.
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52. FAO, State of Food and Agriculture 2014: Innovation in Family Farming (2014), online: <http://
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